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Introduction
The sustained growth of emerging economies has substantially increased worldwide demand for natural resources. Not surprisingly, countries that depend on imports of such resources increasingly discuss the issue of resource security, and increased competition for scarce resources has lead to warnings about "resource wars", a "new scramble for Africa" or a "new great game" for access to Central Asian gas and oil (Cooley 2012 , Halper 2010 , Shambaugh 2013 . As a corollary of this development, international …rms in natural resource industries from emerging economies have been seeking better access to resources and upstream integration in the form of substantially increased foreign direct investment in resource-rich countries. Governments of host countries have welcomed the arrival of these new investors, whereas international companies from traditional and developed source countries have seen their pro…tability threatened as these competing investors were moving in. 1 Investing in natural resources is particularly problematic for international investors in the presence of weak institutions in host countries. Non-renewable resources such as oil, gas or metals are particularly vulnerable to weak property rights because they are usually regionally concentrated, need high expenditures for search and exploration, and take considerable time before they become marketable. This exposes investors to the risk of renegotiation or expropriation, i.e. being hold-up, and this can be regarded as one dimension of the resource curse (Bhattacharyya and 1 Famous cases of rivalry between foreign …rms for access to oil resources are the US-UK con ‡ict between the world wars in the Middle East and Latin America (Venn 1986 , Yergin 1991 or the Chinese-US con ‡ict in Central Asia more recently. Maurer (2013) , for instance, describes how Peru exploited the con ‡ict between the US and the UK in the 1970s, and Cooley (2012) shows how Kazakhstan exploited the con ‡ict between the US and China after independence. Host governments expropriating and transfering foreign investments to national oil …rms, in turn, has a long history with a peak in the 1970s and 1980s and a renewed increase over more recent years (see Hogan et al. 2010 , Tomz and Wright 2010 , Bremmer and Johnston 2009 , Maurer 2013 . 2 Notorious cases where the terms of contracts and agreements have been changed or revoked are Venezuela (Manzano and Monaldi 2010) or Russia (Gustafson 2012) . As Engel and Fischer (2010) report, however, also countries like the US, Canada, Australia and the UK have "renegotiated" contracts and
The hold-up problem in foreign direct investment has been analyzed extensively, starting with the seminal analysis of Eaton and Gersovitz (1983) . Thomas and Worall (1994) , Doyle and van Wijnbergen (1994) , Svensson (1998) and host country governments and addressed the question how the hold-up problem may be overcome and how optimal contracts may look like. These existing studies of the hold-up problem only consider host governments which cannot commit themselves not to take the lion's share of the returns of an investment and/or the invested capital after a foreign investor has irrevocably invested in a host country. Moreover, in this traditional formulation the hold-up problem is independent of the competition between investors, and is therefore not suitable to analyze the potential e¤ects of increased competition for natural resources on investment, host government revenues and pro…tability.
In this study, we provide a new insight that makes it possible to understand the role of competition between foreign investors. It is based on the observation that host countries can not only directly increase taxes on foreign pro…ts or expropriate foreign investors, they can also "renegotiate" contracts, revise concessions and restrict the amount of resources that a particular investor is allowed to exploit. In a resource-based industry, a key determinant of an investor's returns is the actual access to local resources.
Consider the investment in drilling equipment and transportation infrastructure in a given oil …eld. The pro…tability of this investment will not only be determined by the capital investment, the technical and managerial expertise deployed in the host country, and the tax and royalty payments, but will depend crucially on the investor's right to exploit this speci…c …eld. While a host government may grant such rights before the investment is carried out, just as it may promise abstaining from nationalization and con…scatory taxation in the traditional formulation of the hold-up problem, such promises may not be time-consistent. After the investment is sunk, it may be in the host country's interest to renege on the granted rights to exploit local resources, and instead grant these rights to another interested party, such as another foreign investor or a domestic, possibly state-owned, …rm. Since capital is sunk, the investor cannot recoup his investment, and although the investment is not touched and no expropriation is taking place, it becomes useless. What the investor can do, however, is to withdraw his technical expertise, leaving the host country with potentially lower output from given capital investments and resources.
imposed windfall taxes or increased royalties in the natural resource sector.
We study this additional commitment problem and how it interacts with the potential existence of alternative international investors. We demonstrate that the existence of alternative foreign investors substantially changes the interaction between foreign investors and the host government. Intuitively, the presence of competing …rms provides an alternative for the host government to put the natural resource to economic use. Given the host country's inability to commit, this drags investors into over-investing to secure the provision of local resources. This unambiguously bene…ts the host country and hurts foreign investors. Contrary to the classic hold-up problem of taking too much ex post, which typically has negative consequences for the host country, the inability to commit to provide local resources can bene…t host countries if there is more than a single use for local resources. Thus, contrary to the standard hold-up approach, our formulation can generate important e¤ects of competition for natural resources in countries with weak governance, which are in line with the empirical evidence and the cases discussed above. 3 Our study contributes to the vast literature on expropriation of sunk investment already mentioned, but adding the ex-post provision of local resources as an important new dimension of the problem. The analysis relates to Janeba (2000) , who shows that foreign investors can overcome the hold-up problem by investing in excess capacity in an alternative location. This threatens the host government with a shift in economic activity in case of ex post con…scatory taxation. In our analysis, the existence of a competing investor provides an alternative possibility to put local resources to productive use and thereby serves a similar end for the host government, triggering higher investment. Finally, our study adds an important aspect to the literature on resource nationalism and the scramble for resources. It is often argued that in particular China is trying to secure monopolistic access to resources, mostly in Africa. The argument put forward for this is that by securing a monopoly on such resources, China could improve its termsof-trade (see Bonfatti 2009 ). 4 We add another view to this argument by showing that restricted access would increase the pro…ts that a monopolistic investor could make. A restriction of competition from other investors would thus directly shift more pro…ts to the investor, independent from potential terms-of-trade considerations.
Foreign investment in natural resources
In what follows we develop a model to illustrate a stylized story of foreign investment, the risk of expropriation, the allocation of resources to be combined with the capital stock, and technical expertise provided by the investor. We think of this as a foreign …rm that invests in a resource rich country, for instance in drilling equipment, a mine, or an oil or gas pipeline to exploit those resources. This revenue from this investment is subject to ex-post expropriation after the investment has been sunk. Expropriation can be full or partial in the sense that tax arrangements or pro…t-sharing agreements can be broken.
This gives rise to the standard hold-up problem.
The second hold-up problem is that the host country's government can renege on the concession and access to the resource by, for instance, not supplying the pipeline or blocking access to the mine or oil or gas …eld. We assume that there is …xed amount of exploitable resources, such as an oil …eld, to which the host countries grants access because it is unable to exploit the resource on its own, either because it is capital-constrained or lacks the necessary technical expertise. With a competing investor, however, the country can renege on its promise to grant access and instead shift the right of access to another investor who can provide the necessary additional expertise.
Lastly, the investors have to decide how much e¤ort to provide after capital has been invested and access to resources has been given. We think of this as, for instance, sending quali…ed personal or additional (non-sunk) technical equipment to operate the initially invested equipment. Extraction of the resource depends critically on this additional e¤ort by the investor and is impossible without it.
As our benchmark, we …rst show that, with commitment, for a given amount of domestic resources it does not matter for total investment, output and tax revenues whether a single, or two competing foreign investors are present in the host country. We then contrast the di¤erential outcome between the single investor case and the case of two competing investors without commitment to show how this will lead to higher investment, higher output, higher government revenues and lower pro…ts for foreign investors.
Finally, we can compare total investment and tax revenues with and without commitment.
This allows us to show that the positive e¤ect of competition on investment without commitment can dominate the negative e¤ect of the absence of commitment and can result in higher total investment and tax revenues.
The basic framework
We start by considering a resource-based industry which relies on foreign investors, de- Factor costs, r (for capital k i ) and w (for non-resource input z i ) are given, constant and equal for all investors. Output is sold in the world market at an exogenous price of one.
Capital investment is sunk once deployed in the host country and, without commitment, subject to con…scatory taxation ex post. Similar to Janeba (2000), we do not explicitly study repeated interaction. However, the investor also provides his technical and business expertise z i , and can adjust this input depending on his tax burden t i and the amount of local resources m i allocated to him. The possibility to adjust another factor of production does not eliminate the hold-up problem entirely but alleviates it.
We assume that taxation takes the form of a speci…c tax t i per unit of output that is applied uniformly to all foreign investors. This amounts to a situation where the host country charges an excise on output, such as, for example, the number of barrels of oil exported. In many real world contracts, the pro rata payments are complemented by a lump sum up-front payment (Hogan et al. 2010) . Such a payment could be easily added into our analysis without changing the results.
The upfront investment may be interpreted narrowly to include only capital in the actual business venture. Alternatively, it may be interpreted more widely to also include other investments made by foreign investors into the local infrastructure, which is often the case with Chinese investments in Africa (Brautigam 2009, Economy and Levi 2014) .
Similarly, the local resource provided by the host government may be interpreted narrowly as access to natural resources, or more widely to additionally include inputs provided by the host government such as administrative and legal support or publicly provided infrastructure whose use can be restricted. Importantly, the host government may not be able to commit ex ante on the level of this input. In addition, only an exogenous level of these resources m is available. Treating the overall level of m as …xed can either be justi…ed by the fact that the total amount of the available non-renewable resources is limited by nature. Alternatively, it may be interpreted as the maximum level of the natural resource that can be processed within a given time period, where the local government does not inter-temporally optimize the exploitation of its resource. 5 We contrast the commitment case, where the government can commit to tax rates and the allocation of domestic resources ex ante, and the no commitment case, where it cannot. Moreover, we consider the di¤erences between the case of a single investor and the case of two competing investors in each of these cases. The latter situation is called the competing investor case or the competition case. In this competition case, we assume throughout that the two investors take their decisions non-cooperatively. In the absence of government commitment both …rms use their up-front investment to a¤ect the government's decision how to allocate the domestic resources between investors since their pro…ts depend on the share of resources that they receive. Finally, we assume that …rms are symmetric and focus on the symmetric equilibrium.
The stages of the game di¤er between the commitment and the no-commitment case.
The timing under commitment is as follows: in stage 1, the host government commits to a tax rate/tax rates t i and to the allocation of the natural resource m i to either a single investor or how it shares access to it among competing investors. In stage 2, the foreign investor/investors decides/decide about capital investment and about the complementary input z i . Without commitment there are three stages in the game. Their sequence is as follows. In stage 1 the investor/the investors decides/decide how much capital k i to invest, and this capital is sunk. In the case of two competing investors they decide simultaneously.
In stage 2, the host government government sets a tax rate/tax rates t i and decides on the allocation of the natural resource m i . Finally, in stage three, the investor/the investors decides/decide on the level of the complementary input z i , and tax revenues and net-of tax pro…ts are then realized.
Full commitment
As our benchmark, we …rst analyze the case in which the host government can fully commit on the level of taxation and the amount of resources made available to each foreign investor. We focus on the di¤erence between the single investor case and the case of two competing investors, since our main interest is to identify the di¤erential e¤ect between these two cases in the absence of commitment. We summarize our benchmark …nding:
Proposition 1 In a symmetric equilibrium with competing investors which produce using a Cobb-Douglas technology, total factor inputs, total output, the tax rate, total tax revenues, and total after tax pro…ts are equal to the single investor case, if the government can commit to its policy.
Proof. See Appendix.
Intuitively, under commitment, the decision problem of each individual investor is structurally equivalent to that of a single investor, given a certain level of local resources provided to the investor and given the level of taxation. The host government divides the local resource arbitrarily between investors and chooses the same tax rate as with a single investor to maximize its revenue. Given the constant returns to scale technology, the aggregate inputs of all investors equal the total inputs of the single investor. 6 Accordingly, total output is equal in both cases as well as total tax revenues and total after-tax pro…ts. The bottom line is that under commitment it makes no di¤erence whether the host government deals with a single or multiple investors. Finally, note that, under commitment, our restriction on the set of admissible contracts prevents an e¢ cient investment level, since the linear tax distorts the investment decision. If we allowed for more general contracts, i.e. a contract specifying the e¢ cient input levels of k i and z i and a lump-sum payment to the investor that allowed him to break even, e¢ ciency could be achieved. However, also in this case, the e¢ cient outcome is independent of the number of investors.
No commitment: A single investor
We consider …rst the case of a single investor. with …rst order condition
which implicitly de…nes z s = z s (t s ; k s ; m s ).
At stage 2, the host country government decides on t s and m s . We assume that it maximizes revenue. This can be motivated by a non-benevolent government, but it is also fully compatible with welfare maximization since output is sold in the world market and the foreign investor's pro…ts accrue to non-local residents. Since the host country has no alternative use for the local resource without the foreign investment, it sets m s = m. The government's problem with respect to the optimal ex post taxation then is to 
The investor equates the direct marginal e¤ect on net pro…ts, the indirect e¤ect on net pro…ts via the corresponding adjustment of the additional input, and the indirect marginal e¤ect from the resulting adjustment of the tax rate with the opportunity cost of capital.
No commitment: Competing investors
Consider now the case where the host country admits two investors i = 1; 2 into the country. 
where condition (5) illustrates how the host government allocates local resources between the two competing investors such that the resulting marginal tax revenue is equalized across investors. Since the host government participates in the …rms'revenue with shares t 1 and t 2 , respectively, it is in its interest to maximize total output by allocating the resources e¢ ciently between the …rms whenever t 1 = t 2 .
In stage 1 both …rms simultaneously decide on their investment k i , solving
with …rst order condition
for i = 1; 2. For both investors, adding an additional unit of capital may change the level of taxation. Moreover, there are now three e¤ects of an additional unit of capital on after tax pro…ts as can be seen by the terms in squared brackets on the left hand side of (6).
First, the direct e¤ect and the indirect e¤ect via the adjustment of z i are analogous to the single investor case. Second, there is now an additional strategic e¤ect, which results from the response of the host government to reallocate the available local resources across investors. The latter consists of a direct e¤ect and an indirect e¤ect stemming from the increased leverage of adjusting the complementary input. The …rst order conditions (6) implicitly de…ne the investors'best responses vis-à-vis each other, k 1 (k 2 ) and k 2 (k 1 ).
Without commitment the question arises whether the host government could also be tempted not only to shift domestic resources between investors or to increase taxes ex post, but to also expropriate one investor and shift this capital stock to the other investor.
We have not allowed for this possibility, but it is straightforward to see that this is not a binding restriction in our model. In fact, the government can never increase its tax revenues from such an action, since total production and thus tax revenues will not be increased from such an action under constant returns to scale.
Comparison
We can now study the di¤erential e¤ects of competing investors relative to the situation with a single investor. First, we consider the overall level of investment.
Proposition 2 Let technology be of the Cobb-Douglas type. Then, without commitment, there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium, in which we have k i > k s =2 for each individual investor, and total investment is higher than in the single investor case, i.e. P i=1;2
As we show in the Appendix, the comparative statics are straightforward with CobbDouglas technology. In particular, @t i @k i = 0, which implies that the equations (3) and (6), which determine the investment in both cases, simplify substantially. Moreover,
i.e. increased investment results in a higher share of domestic resources allocated to the investor by the host government. Intuitively, since the host government cannot commit to the provision of resources, both investors can a¤ect the allocation of local resources in their favor through their investment. Since the host country participates in the overall production via ex post taxation, additional investment, which increases overall output, is a suitable instrument to a¤ect the distribution of resources in the respective investor's direction. Of course, in the symmetric equilibrium, the strategic e¤ects of additional investment cancel out, and both investors receive only half of the available resources. 7 We turn now to the e¤ect of competition on tax revenues. Proof. According to Proposition 2 both …rms together choose a higher level of investment. Moreover, with Cobb-Douglas technology the host government chooses the same tax rate as in the single investor case. Given the same tax rate and higher total investment both investors choose a level of z i , so that P i=1;2 z i > z s =2 . Thus, total output increases and government revenues, which are a …xed fraction of that, must also increase.
This result shows that the host government unambiguously pro…ts from increased competition. With competing investors, and a production that relies on domestic inputs controlled by the government, the inability to commit turns into a strategic advantage for the host government. 8 Next, we consider pro…ts.
Proposition 4 Given Cobb-Douglas technology, total pro…ts in the single investor case are higher than aggregate pro…ts in the multiple investor case, i.e. s > P i=1;2 i . Proof. The single investor could choose an alternative, higher level of investment
This would result in the same level of taxes as in the competing investors case and the same overall level of additional factor inputs. Accordingly, output and after tax pro…ts would equal P i=1;2 i . The fact that this level of investment is not chosen by a single investor reveals that total pro…ts are lower in the competing investors case.
The result shows how competition for local resources not only induces higher investment, but that increased investment hurts the …rms relative to the single investor case.
Our Propositions 2-4 rely crucially on the inability of the government to commit ex ante on the available level of local resources. If the production function did not require m as a factor of production, the hold-up problem would only consist of the host government setting excessively high taxes after investors have irrevocably invested. In this case, there would be no strategic interaction between investors. Thus, the inability to commit "to give" has speci…c implications that are not present in the traditional hold-up situation where the government only cannot commit "not to take". Only by taking these additional considerations into account it is possible to understand the e¤ects of competition for the overall level of investment, tax revenues and pro…tability in resource based-industries in countries with weak property rights protection.
Finally, the assumption of Cobb-Douglas technology allows us to explicitly solve for total investment with and without commitment. While the investment level will obviously always be higher under commitment with a single investor, this is less evident with multiple investors. In this case the second hold-up problem with respect to providing the domestic resources, which triggers higher investments, may overcompensate the hold-up problem with respect to ex-post taxation. This possibility is stated in Proposition 5.
Proposition 5 With Cobb-Douglas technology total investment with two competing investors, and tax revenues can be higher without commitment than with commitment.
As we show in the Appendix, this is more likely to happen when the domestic resource is more important for production. Intuitively, the strategic over-investment e¤ects are particularly strong in this case, and they can overcompensate the higher level of ex-post con…scatory taxation.
Conclusion
Our main argument is that the competition for access to natural resources in an uncertain legal environment gives rise to a "second" hold-up problem. Not only do international investors su¤er the standard risk of being taxed beyond initial agreement or being expropriated, but they also face the risk of denied access to local resources. This risk depends on the competition between foreign investors and the scope of the host government to shift domestic resources to competitors. Competition for natural resources helps host countries with weak property rights protection to induce higher investment in the absence of commitment. Our approach, we would argue, is particularly relevant for the recent surge in natural resources-related foreign investments by investors from emerging countries. After all, …rms from traditional "Western" countries have been competing with each other for access to natural resources in developing countries for many decades (Venn 1986 , Yergin 1991 ). However, the problem as analyzed above may be less relevant for such investors.
These investors may turn for help to the legal system in their home countries and pursue formal or informal action against other investors who are bene…ting from the re-allocation of local resources by the host government (Jo¤é et al. 2009 ). Such measures are likely to be particularly e¤ective where international investors have business interests and tangible property in the home countries of those competing …rms, facilitating collusion among them. 9 In the case of competing investors from emerging countries, however, such action is much less e¤ective, since these new source countries themselves have weaker protection of foreign investment and often no unbiased access to the legal system. Moreover, investors from these countries typically have less developed business interests and fewer assets in OECD countries, and are thus less vulnerable to defensive legal action. The scope for suitable actions by an investor from a traditional source country who is negatively a¤ected by a decision of a host country to reallocate access to natural resources or other essential local inputs to a rival from an emerging country is thus more limited compared to actions against a traditional competitor.
Our framework captures the latter situation and is accordingly well suited to explain why the recent expansion of foreign direct investment in resource-based and resourceextracting industries in countries with weak governance is perceived to threaten the prof- 
For notational purpose we have added the bar over the equilibrium factor inputs with commitment to distinguish these variables from the outcomes derived for the non-commitment case below. With two investors both …rms maximize i = (1 t i ) k i m i z rk i wz i by choosing k i and z i with …rst order conditions
Note that both are linear in m i . The host government's problem is
The …rst order conditions with respect to t 1 and t 2 are
so that t i = ; i = 1; 2: Moreover, government revenue is linear in m, such that any split of the local resource is optimal. Assume that the government arbitrarily splits the resource, allocating a share 1 to …rm 1, and a share 2 = 1 1 to …rm 2. Total investment is
Total investment is independent of the number of investors under commitment. Likewise P z i = z s . Thus, depending on the split of m, the investors'factor inputs will be split in the same proportion and total factor inputs are equal to the single investor case. Given the constant returns to scale property of the Cobb-Douglas technology total output is the same with a single investor or two competing investors. Finally, given that the tax rate is the same in both cases, total tax revenues are also equal.
Proof of Proposition 2
Consider …rst the single investor case without commitment. 
The …rst order conditions are 
The problem of investor i; i = 1; 2 at the …rst stage is 
respectively. Since + 1 2 > 0 we have 2k i > k s , i.e. total investment in the competing investor case is always higher. 
Since inequality (A8) cannot be solved analytically, we rely on simulations to illustrate the conditions under which investment will be higher without commitment and competing investors relative to the commitment case. This is illustrated in Figure 1 and shows how this typically depends on the importance of the domestic resource as a factor of production.
Finally, we show by example that tax revenues in the competing investor case without commitment can be higher than tax revenues in the commitment case. To this end, it is useful to express the tax base as a function of the invested capital stock in both cases.
Tax revenues with and without commitment are, respectively,
